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Introduction  
Intermarriage has been viewed by ethnicity theorists as a strong indicator of ethnic 
assimilation and integration (Spickard 1989: 10–13). The original assumption was that the 
minority group sought to assimilate into the dominant society. Yet the context for 
intermarriage is not always or necessarily dictated by the dominant group; it can equally be 
controlled by the dominated. Ethnic groups differ in the fluidity they are prepared to tolerate 
at the margin, and, when closing their boundaries, may try to sever formerly acceptable ties 
with other groups, such as intermarriage (Horowitz 2000: 56, 62). Spickard notes that by the 
turn of the twentieth century, some American minorities (Japanese-Americans, Jews) ‘had 
agendas of their own … shaping the settings of interethnic relationships in which 
intermarriages took place’ (1989: 5). In most interethnic contexts, opinions on intermarriage 
are influenced largely by the images that people construct, in other words, by stereotypes 
rather than experience (Shibata 1998: 83; Spickard 1989: 19). Xinjiang is no exception. In 
this chapter, I employ the controversial TV drama series Xinjiang guniang
1
 (Xinjiang Girls, 
2004) as a vehicle to explore: (1) the use of television in Chinese state projects of social 
engineering; (2) the role of audience reflexivity in the negotiation of self, community, and 
nation; (3) the personal dilemmas of young Uyghurs aspiring to mixed romantic unions; and 
(4) the power of community supervision in the maintenance of (selective) endogamy.  
I show that while the Chinese state has sought to use television as a tool to encourage its ideal 
of ‘social harmony’, Xinjiang Girls had the reverse effect of deepening social controversy 
and shoring up the boundaries it ostensibly sought to remove.
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1 For Chinese language terms, I use the pinyin transliteration system. 
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 The core of the empirical data, gathered during the summers of 2002 and 2004, comprises informal 
conversations with, and direct observations of, some 50 Uyghur respondents of both sexes, of various ages 
(ranging from 17 to 75), and from various localities (Kashgar, Khotän, Ürümchi, Qumul, Ghulja, and Aqsu). At 
the time of interview, all respondents were based in Ürümchi. They represent a diverse range of social 
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Ethnic intermarriage as minzu tuanjie (nationality unity) 
While policies towards ethnic intermarriage in China have oscillated over the centuries 
(Smith Finley 2013), mixed unions have often symbolized Chinese (Han) sovereignty, 
serving as a vehicle for the subjugation of the peripheries and the cultural assimilation of 
non-Han groups (Bulag 2002: 98–99; Harrell 1994: 19). Uradyn Bulag shows how the 
Mongolian people were ‘domesticated’ through a poetics of minzu tuanjie (nationality unity), 
embodied partly in the marital union (2002: 15, 23). Following the establishment of the PRC 
in 1949, assimilation through intermarriage was openly pursued during politically ‘red’ 
campaigns. During more conciliatory periods, while not enforced, intermarriage was actively 
supported. According to Tashmämät, a historian in his forties from Kashgar,
3
 many Uyghurs 
were sent to China proper in the 1950s and 1960s to study and were encouraged to remain 
there following graduation. As a result, many Uyghur men took Han wives and produced 
mixed-race offspring (cf. Qarluq and McMillen 2011: 23). Tashmämät characterized this as a 
deliberate government attempt to assimilate the Uyghur ethnic group. The recent ‘Xinjiang 
Class’ programme, which provides state funding for teenaged Uyghurs to study in eastern 
China and aims to ‘enhance ethnic integration’ (Chen 2010: 2), has similarly come in for 
criticism as a government plot to increase rates of intermarriage.
4
 The socio-political function 
of intermarriage is lauded by some (though not all) contemporary Han scholars. Xie Lei 
argues that, historically, Tibetan–Han intermarriage was ‘a necessity’ to ensure the 
harmonious co-existence of ethnic groups, while in contemporary times the practice has 
‘suppressed splittist behaviour, prompted ethnic unity, and upheld the peaceful unification of 
the motherland’ (2006: 148–9, my translation). His view reflects that of Chinese historians 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
backgrounds, including intellectuals, retired persons, employees of state work units, students and graduates of 
high schools and universities, independent traders, police officers, and service industry employees. While their 
names and the specific details of their professions are altered to protect their identities, information concerning 
age, occupation, and hometown is retained. Rising tensions between Uyghurs and Han Chinese since the early 
1990s meant that if one group saw you in the company of the other, it regarded you with suspicion. Thus, since I 
was interested mainly in Uyghur attitudes towards intermarriage, I decided not to compromise Uyghurs’ trust by 
associating openly with Han residents (cf. Smith 2006). While some of those interviewed were long-term 
respondents whom I had known since 1995, others were people with whom I built a mutually trusting 
relationship during the 2002 and 2004 field trips. Conversations took place in a variety of locations, including 
respondents' homes, my hotel, Uyghur restaurants, cafes, teahouses, and public parks. 
3 For Uyghur language transliterations, I use the Romanization system adopted in Komatsu 2005. For place 
names in Xinjiang, I use the Uyghur language version preferred by local inhabitants, with one exception: the 
southern oasis of Qäshqär is rendered ‘Kashgar’ in recognition of the conventional use of that name in English-
language publications. 
4
 The ‘Xinjiang Class’ project (since 2000) is a national policy which established four-year boarding high school 
classes (Xinjiangban) for elite Uyghur students, to be attended in Han-majority schools in eastern cities of the 
PRC. Since 2005, the estimated total enrolment has exceeded 20,000 individuals in 500 classes across 24 inland 
cities (Chen 2010: 2). 
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who portray Wencheng, the Chinese wife of Tibetan king Songtsen Gampo (ca. 618–50), as a 
pioneer of unity and friendship between Hans and Tibetans, and of the sinicization of Tibetan 
culture. Yet in Tibetan accounts, she plays only a peripheral role (Powers 2004: 31, 37).  
In contemporary Xinjiang, official tourist guides and heritage signs emphasize the 
contribution made to ‘nationality harmony’ by the marriage between the (Uyghur) Fragrant 
Concubine and the Qianlong emperor (Fuller and Lipman 2004; Millward 1994; Zarcone 
1999). Yet this state representation contrasts sharply with local Uyghur oral histories, which 
claim that the Fragrant Concubine refused to allow the consummation of the marriage, and 
planned to kill the Qianlong emperor in revenge for his occupation of her homeland. As 
Fuller and Lipman remark, ‘these anachronistic arguments project contemporary social 
conflicts backward 200 or 300 years’ (2004: 321–2). The Chinese state, aware of the potential 
for intermarried people to form bridges and mediate ethnic conflicts (cf. Shibata 1998: 97), 
has enshrined in law the principle that neither a couple’s parents/family nor any third party 
shall influence an individual’s marriage choice.5 According to Uyghur respondents, the state 
is particularly eager to encourage marriages between Uyghur females and Han males, a 
practice referred to as a ‘one-way street’. Here we find echoes of the resentment expressed by 
African-American and Nisei (second-generation) Japanese-American communities in the 
United States concerning the ‘one-sided privilege’ of the dominant group (white males) in 
instigating sexual relations with black women (Evers 1975: 155) and in dating Japanese 
women (Spickard 1989: 65). Ibrahim, an observant male in his seventies from Khotan, 
attributed the state’s eagerness to a latent aim to Sinicize minorities by means of patrilineal 
descent:  
If an Uyghur man wants to marry a Han woman, it’s extremely difficult. The Han 
relatives won’t agree − the child’s name follows the father’s line − but the authorities 
won’t intervene. Yet if a Han man wants to marry an Uyghur woman, that’s different. 
He can do so easily because the authorities interfere, supposedly for the sake of ethnic 
unity, but really because the child will take a Han name! … They call the two families 
in to ‘educate’ them, remind them that the law protects freedom of marital choice, and 
accuse them of ‘local nationalism’ [Uy.: millätchiliq] if they persist in opposing the 
match.  
 
                                                          
5
 Cf. Gladney 2004: 62−63 on the film Amazing Marriage Customs (1992), which documents marriage practices 
among China’s 56 nationalities and employs a voiceover to reiterate the law of non-interference. 
4 
 
In this way, local Uyghur families have come under increased pressure from the authorities to 
cease their interventions. 
 
Intermarriage statistics in contemporary China  
Rates of exogamy for ‘severely divided societies’ typically run below 10 per cent of all 
marriages, or lower where only unions between the most conflicted groups are counted 
(Horowitz 2000: 62). Correspondingly, Chinese social scientists consider an intermarriage 
rate of 10 per cent or higher between groups as an indicator of ‘relatively good ethnic 
relations’ (Li Xiaoxia 2004: 20; cf. Zhang 2005: 24). However, the rate of intermarriage 
between minority and Han in China varies by region and group. A study conducted in 
Kunming, south-west China, found that ethnic intermarriage was prevalent, and that most 
spouses valued equal social status more than common ethnicity (Xing 2007: 170, 175, 178).
6
 
In Xinjiang, the situation is quite different: intermarriage between Han migrants and minority 
females is on the increase with all groups but the Uyghurs (Ren and Yuan 2003: 99). Ma 
Rong, conducting a survey in 1997 on ethnic relations in Qaghiliq (Chi.: Yecheng) County, 
Kashgar Prefecture, failed to find a single instance of Uyghur–Han intermarriage. While his 
team found three examples in a neighbouring horticultural garden, all occurred within the 
same family (Ma 2003: 120), suggesting that ethnically mixed marriages commonly repeat 
down generations (cf. Li Xiaoxia 2005: 63–64). In Herbert Yee’s study of Uyghur–Han 
relations in urban Xinjiang, conducted in 2000, 78 per cent of Han respondents gave the 
green light to intermarriage, but less than one-third of Uyghur respondents approved. Indeed, 
the actual level of Uyghur approval was probably lower if we account for respondents giving 
politically correct answers. Only seven out of Yee’s 378 respondents (1.8 per cent) were in a 
mixed Uyghur–Han marriage (2003: 436–7). Zhang Suqi’s study, conducted in Turpan in the 
early 2000s, revealed just four instances of Uyghur–Han intermarriage in 2001, rising to nine 
instances in 2003 (2005: 25). While finding that Uyghurs are more likely to intermarry with 
Han than with any other group (Kazakhs and Hui sit in second and third place), Li Xiaoxia 
calculated the intermarriage rate among Uyghurs at just 0.62 per cent (2004: 21). In their 
comparative study of ethnic intermarriage in Beijing and Xinjiang, Mamet, Jacobson, and 
Heaton found that, of all minority groups in Xinjiang, the odds of exogamy were lowest 
among Uyghur males (just 0.2 per cent) and Uyghur females (0.46 per cent) (2005: 198, 200). 
According to another study conducted in rural areas of Kashgar prefecture, strict endogamy 
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 At the same time, Xing’s findings suggested that, as the size of urban minority elites increased after 1990, 
minority individuals increasingly sought to match both status and ethnicity when choosing a mate (2007).  
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remains the rule, with 99.39 per cent of couples registered in all-Uyghur marriages (Hu 2006: 
15–16). Here, as in Turpan, the number of intermarried couples had doubled between 2000 
and 2004, but the proportion of such unions within the total population remained negligible 
(Hu 2006: 16). 
In interviews I conducted in 2002 and 2004, respondents in Xinjiang conceded that 
intermarriage had ‘very slightly increased’, estimating the percentage of individuals taking 
this course at around 1 per cent. Most believed that the majority of intermarriages occur in 
the regional capital, Ürümchi, a perception supported by one study, which found that the odds 
of exogamy in Xinjiang increase among the young, the highly educated urban residents, and 
northern residents (Mamet, Jacobson, and Heaton 2005: 199). All respondents noted that 
Uyghur women were more likely to take Han husbands than the reverse, a gendered pattern 
also confirmed in domestic and international scholarship (Mamet, Jacobson, and Heaton 2005: 
196, 201; Zhang 2005: 24). Yet, if anything, this small increase in intermarriage seems to 
have heightened the degree of ethnic resistance as families and communities respond to 
boundary transgression.  
 
Television and audience reflexivity 
Media researchers agree that the mass media have been used predominantly as vehicles for 
the official viewpoint, a means to structure public opinion and promote particular ideologies 
and narratives (Lee and Cho 1990: 33–34; Skuse 2005: 164). In this sense, mass media 
become tools of social engineering with the capacity to alter public perception. However, it is 
equally recognized that the audience’s social experience affects the way in which it reads the 
television text, so that viewing a TV programme becomes a process of negotiation between 
the text and the context of the audience (Lee and Cho 1990: 37, 42), or ‘a dialogue between 
fiction and reality, television and country’ (Acosta-Alzuru 2010: 186). It has been argued, for 
example, that television invites a continual reconfiguration of boundaries presumed to delimit 
the cultural world (Saenz 1994: 575), and that analysis of popular television narratives must 
be undertaken in the context of struggles over the construction of identity (Jontes 2010: 716–
7). Television thus invites reflection on social life and generates the space for a politics of 
audience reception. The dynamic between visual representation and society was observed in 
America in the 1960s, a period during which social attitudes towards black–white 
intermarriage began to change. Two films dealt with this sensitive issue. The first, One 
Potato, Two Potato (1964), stressed the inevitability of societal censure, i.e. white harassment 
of mixed couples. A few years later, Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner (1968) presented a more 
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hopeful outlook, progressing through serious moments to finally reach a positive outcome 
(Spickard 1989: 294).  
China’s main television network, Chinese Central Television (CCTV), founded in 
1958, was originally envisaged as the ‘throat and tongue’ of the Chinese Communist Party, a 
‘totalising state voice’ for the project of socialist modernity (Sun 2007: 188–9). Yet following 
China’s embrace of global market economics since 1980, a tension has evolved between the 
state’s desire for a Gramscian form of hegemonic control on the one hand, and the creative 
impulse of television combined with naked economic ambition on the other. As a result, in 
China too, televisual forms of representation now enjoy a reciprocal relationship with the 
society that creates them; they are ‘indexical to, and constitutive of, the profound changes 
taking place in the imagination of self, home, place, time, community and nation’ (Sun 2007: 
189–90). The use of television by Chinese cultural elites as a vehicle to stimulate intellectual 
debate was first witnessed in 1988, in the shape of the documentary series Heshang (‘River 
Elegy’). This series, which rejected the ‘backward’ Chinese worldview in favour of a (then) 
coveted Western civilization, is widely considered to have altered the means of imagining the 
Chinese nation and to have challenged the tradition of didactic representation (Sun 2007: 
192–3).  
In Xinjiang, social and political realities are often strikingly different from those in 
China proper, and this is no less true for state control of mass media. On 1 January 2002, 
Uyghur poet Tursunjan Amat recited a poem titled ‘Wild Pigeon’ following the close of a 
public concert in Ürümchi.
7
 In the days that followed, officials condemned the poem as 
‘inflammatory’, charging that it exerted a bad influence on society by advocating ethnic 
separatism. The chairman of the regional government subsequently called for a strengthening 
of the anti-separatism struggle in the ideological field, and announced a series of ‘study 
classes’ to be undertaken by media personnel involved in literature and the arts, the press and 
publishing, radio, television, film production, cultural management, social science research, 
and other fields. These classes were intended to educate media personnel in how to wage ‘a 
just and forceful struggle against all kinds of acts opposing the unity of the motherland’ 
(Amnesty International 2002). In this context, the production of Xinjiang Girls can be seen as 
a media attempt to engineer social harmony in a context of regional political unrest. Indeed, 
at the global level, ‘mass media interventions’ are increasingly employed by governments 
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 The poem tells the allegorical story of the son of a pigeon king who is trapped and caged by humans while on a 
mission to find a new home for his flock. He commits suicide by eating a poisoned strawberry rather than 
sacrifice his freedom. 
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and NGOs as a tool of change or conflict reduction. A key example is the Latin American 
telenovela genre, described as a ‘guide to nationalism, modernity and social change’ (Skuse 
2005: 160–1; cf. Acosta-Alzuru 2010). Yet studies show that television dramas also have 
enormous potential to invite social criticism. To cite one example, Korean viewers 
demonstrate audience reflexivity when they criticize domestic Korean dramas (which 
typically represent women as limited to the home) and imported Western dramas (whose 
depictions of sexual freedom invite moral condemnation and withdrawal to a ‘superior 
distance’) (Kim 2005: 451, 460). In this way, television viewers selectively incorporate some 
values into the reflexive formation of their lives while contesting others (Kim 2005: 458).  
 
The TV drama Xinjiang Girls (2004) 
The controversies surrounding ‘one-way intermarriage’ in Xinjiang were neatly reflected in 
public reactions to the state-commissioned TV drama series Xinjiang guniang (‘Xinjiang 
Girls’), which I found myself watching in a Beijing street restaurant in July 2004. This TV 
play was rare in the PRC in that it was directed by an Uyghur woman (Chi.: Wuliyasi 
Mayinuowa; Uy.: Maynur Ilyas) and acted almost exclusively by Uyghurs; the exception was 
a Han male who takes the sole Han part (Frangville 2007; Yuan 2008). The 20-episode series, 
whose plot unfolds chronologically, was broadcast on CCTV Channel 8 − the national 
channel reserved for serialized dramas − and follows the lives of four daughters of an Uyghur 
professor based at the Central University for Nationalities in Beijing. While all four were 
raised and educated in the Chinese capital, the two eldest live in Ürümchi while the two 
youngest remain in Beijing. As the director shares her complex vision of the diverse personal 
experiences of the four women, we find that only the eldest daughter − a doctor − is stable in 
both her professional and personal life. The second youngest daughter, a translator, is 
troubled by the dilemma of ‘situating herself as a modern woman in a culturally determined 
community’ (Frangville 2007: 329), and the youngest chooses an international lifestyle as 
part of a dance troupe rather than return to a Xinjiang homeland she has never known (see 
Schluessel [ch. 12 in this volume] on the sense of cultural crisis now being debated among 
Uyghur intellectuals). But it is the second eldest daughter, a civil servant torn between her 
memories of an absent Uyghur husband and a new Han beau, who provides the central focus 
for the story. In the face of fierce opposition from her grandfather, portrayed as tradition-
bound and inflexible, the drama concludes by suggesting that the Han beau should remain 
hopeful and wait patiently until the Uyghurs are ‘modern enough’ to accept intermarriage (cf. 
Frangville 2007: 330).  
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In her analysis of cinematic roles played by China’s minority nationalities since 1950, 
Vanessa Frangville argues that, despite the evident aim of the female Uyghur director to 
underline the complexity of contemporary Uyghur identities through the vehicle of the four 
daughters, Xinjiang Girls nonetheless reflects minority stereotypes circulated among the 
majority Han. These include: (1) the representation of the Uyghur family as symbolic of a 
united Uyghur community; (2) the assumption that the Uyghur patriarch is obstructive to the 
match only because of cultural differences deriving from the two groups’ different stages of 
development; and (3) the representation of the Uyghur father as an apologist for the Uyghurs’ 
‘backwardness’ in the context of the obvious devotion of his would-be Han son-in-law 
(Frangville 2007: 329−330). For Frangville, these examples prove that Han discourses of 
minority peoples are inevitably reproduced within the minority consciousness (2007: 330). 
Her compatriot, Marie Bellot, goes a step further, proposing that the reproduction of such 
stereotypes shows that Uyghurs have ‘willingly placed themselves in a position of inferiority 
vis-à-vis the Han’ (2010: 84). Without having interviewed Ilyas, it is hard to know this 
female Uyghur director's intentions. However, I would suggest that the scenarios could be 
interpreted quite differently, if we afford the director the same capacity to resist hegemony as 
is routinely afforded the audience (cf. Skuse 2005: 161; see also Nyima [ch. 5] and Cencetti 
[ch. 6] in this volume on the active engagement of Tibetan herders in shaping the effects of 
state intervention). Perhaps Ilyas intended to champion − and strengthen − the solidarities 
that have arisen within the Uyghur family and wider community in the face of seemingly 
irresistible social forces of ethnic assimilation (see Hann [ch. 7] and Robin [ch. 8] in this 
volume on Uyghur and Tibetan resistance to the state policy of ‘bilingual education’); or to 
send a message to the state that its goal of social harmony is not so easily achieved. One 
might even speculate that she predicted in advance the uproar that this socially unacceptable 
thread would create, and purposely included it to ensure high viewing rates in the Uyghur 
community and further build popular resistance to Uyghur−Han intermarriage. In other words, 
Ilyas may have purposely employed popular culture as a means to create collective freedom 
in a situation of individual oppression (Fabian 1998: 19). And, of course, one should not 
underestimate the commercial gain involved in such a strategy. 
Most interviewees in Ürümchi (2004) resented the suggestion that Uyghurs need to 
‘adapt to the modern world’, and that they can achieve this by intermarrying with Han people. 
Many insisted that the drama was politically motivated − an example of what Sun calls 
‘indoctri-tainment’: the delivery of indoctrination packaged as television entertainment (2007: 
191). Räwiä, a first-generation minkaohan (Chinese-educated Uyghur) in her forties, was 
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deeply cynical: ‘All those around me saw it as a propaganda exercise. Hoping to make us 
Uyghurs marry with Hans more and more. But they can’t assimilate us all, can they?’8 Dilbär, 
a female minkaomin (Uyghur-educated Uyghur) high school student, remarked that ‘the Hans’ 
− conceived as a monolithic entity − would like to see the drama end in successful 
intermarriage, just as they would like to see ethnic unity and rapprochement in society. 
Others, such as Ömär, a male minkaomin high school student, acknowledged that Xinjiang 
Girls dealt with an existing social phenomenon which, while infrequent, was ‘a grave 
problem’. All insisted that the implications of the drama’s conclusion were ‘unrepresentative’ 
of the actual situation. Aynur, a minkaomin graduate in her twenties, argued that in reality 
very few Uyghurs could accept Uyghur–Han intermarriage, a view echoed by Dilbär, who 
noted that while people will happily watch a fictional drama, they could not bear such a 
storyline in real life. According to Jelil, an observant graduate in his twenties, most of his 
male peers felt that the plot was ‘incorrect’ and ‘dishonest’, while Aynur described how the 
denouement had provoked her to telephone a male cousin in rage. In the most extreme 
reaction, Tashmämät, a historian in his forties from Kashgar, pronounced that the series 
should have been called Xinjiang Prostitutes. These reactions demonstrate that viewers 
‘perceive of the lives of characters as something they can actively engage in or alter’ (Skuse 
2005: 171). Television is transformed into oral culture, and resisted through that culture, as 
its meanings are re-circulated and altered in the course of everyday life (Lee and Cho 1990: 
33). The more ‘unrealistic’ the plot, particularly where it touches on a socio-economic or 
political issue, the lower the level of public tolerance, and the more likely it is that viewers 
will demand to see the problem’s solution in the programme itself (cf. Acosta-Alzuru’s 
analysis of the telenovela Los ninos de la calle [‘Children of the Streets’], 2010: 197). 
Reflecting on media, identity, and struggle in twentieth-century China, Vanessa Fong 
asked how accurately Chinese media representations reflect the lived experiences of China’s 
citizens, and whether citizens accept the messages to which they are exposed (2007: 58). In 
the case of Xinjiang Girls, the portrayal of interethnic courtship was deemed to have little to 
do with social reality, while the message embodied in its plot was firmly rejected. Thus, 
rather than persuading viewers to ‘voluntarily participate in the state’s ideological projects’ 
(Fong 2007: 58), the series stoked pre-existing hostilities and sensitivities surrounding 
Uyghur–Han relations. 
 
                                                          
8
 For a case study of the growth of political awareness within one minkaohan individual over her life course, see 
Smith Finley 2007. 
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The romantic, gentle, and upwardly mobile (male) Other 
Allowing that ethnic intermarriage in Xinjiang has slightly increased, what can we make of 
this phenomenon? For first-generation minkaohan who took Han spouses, it is likely their 
choice was driven partly by ‘internalized oppression’ (Herschel 1995: 179) − the shame of 
being Uyghur, engendered by Han intolerance of minority cultures during the ‘politically red’ 
campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s. This was previously observed among Nisei (second-
generation) Japanese-Americans, who, rejected as possible marriage partners by the white 
community following the Second World War, began to display ambivalence towards their 
own Japanese-ness. In such contexts, some individuals seek to elevate their sense of self-
worth by impressing or conquering a member of the culturally leading race (Beigel 1975: 82). 
For second-generation minkaohan, one might hypothesize that study and work in 
Han-dominated environments leads to a greater instance of Uyghur–Han intermarriage. 
Globally, intermarriage tends to be more common between college-educated individuals, 
owing to their shared experiences of higher education and/or their shared urban, professional 
background (Breger and Hill 1998: 8). In America, intermarriage rates increased across 
successive generations, with the change in the third generation resulting from the lessening of 
ethnic tensions (following the civil rights movement) and the coming of age of a ‘highly 
assimilated and upwardly mobile’ youth (Spickard 1989: 362–3). In contemporary East Asia, 
young, middle-class, educated Koreans display a cosmopolitan willingness to embrace other 
cultures (Kim 2005: 456). Individuals of different ethnicities are especially likely to develop 
close relationships where they grow up together in one community, even in cases where 
groups were historically at conflict (Evers 1975: 153).  
In central and northern Ürümchi, increasing numbers of young, urban Uyghurs are 
being raised in Han-dominated communities and educated in Chinese-medium classes or 
schools. Seeing an Uyghur–Han couple out in public together in 2004 (unheard of in the mid-
1990s), I expressed surprise to Nurmämät, a minkaomin market trader in his forties. He 
retorted, ‘Oh, there’s plenty of that these days! You see, a lot of Uyghurs go to Han schools 
from a young age. So they hardly speak much Uyghur, and end up becoming quasi-Hans [Uy.: 
khänzu bop qalidu].’ Gülhärä, a 20-year-old female minkaomin student, concurred that 
minkaohan Uyghur youth who spend a lot of time with Han peers have developed a ‘Han 
temperament’ (Uy.: Khänzu mijäz), and claimed that some begin to resemble Hans physically. 
This is viewed as a natural consequence of growing up with Han children, as explained by 
Rabiyä, 20, a female minkaomin student: ‘They end up speaking and acting like Hans. They 
don’t speak Uyghur very well, some of them. And so their way of thinking comes to resemble 
11 
 
that of Hans. When they think, they think in Chinese. They’re not comfortable with the 
Uyghur script.’ 
Yet despite popular perception, it became evident that minkaohan and minkaomin 
occupied a diversity of positions along what may be termed an ‘accommodation spectrum’ 
(Smith Finley 2013). Some young Uyghurs at the extreme pole of acculturation, particularly 
females, may be more likely to consider interethnic courtship. I interviewed Gülshäm over a 
four-week period in 2004. A 20-year-old minkaohan who had grown up in Ürümchi, she 
expressed a strong (potential) preference for a Han boyfriend, explaining, ‘I just feel more at 
home with them. I suppose it’s because everyone in my street is Han and I’ve always gone to 
Han schools ever since I was small … so all my friends are Han.’ It is crucial to note that 
Gülshäm came from a single-parent family, composed of an absent minkaohan mother and a 
minkaohan father who spoke only Chinese in the home. Conversely, Burkhan, 15, a heavily 
acculturated minkaohan male, ruled out the possibility of courtship with a Han, despite 
certain structural difficulties: 
  
Our school has separate Chinese-medium and Uyghur-medium classes, and each keeps 
to itself. In our [Chinese-medium] class of 40, there are only three or four Uyghurs plus 
some other minority students. So there is little chance to meet other Uyghurs. But I’m 
still young; when I leave school and go to work, there will be more opportunities to 
meet a [Uyghur] girlfriend.  
 
This suggests that young males adhere to endogamous principles more strictly than young 
females, regardless of language of tuition. Similarly, while some young, urban minkaomin 
expressed a degree of sympathy towards mixed Uyghur–Han unions, others signalled the 
opposite trend: an acute sense of cultural distinctiveness, heightened political consciousness, 
and desire to maintain (selective) endogamy. As an example of the latter type, Yee’s study 
found that at Kashgar Education College, where teaching staff are predominantly minkaomin, 
no intermarriage has ever taken place between Uyghur and Han staff (2003: 450). In any case, 
it is hard to argue that minkaohan are more prone to intermarriage while minkaomin are less 
so.  
Another factor frequently found to underlie mixed unions is the marginalization of 
one or both partners. In former Soviet Central Asia, Turkic members of the Communist elite 
were often orphans or otherwise marginal people who lacked a large kinship network. It was 
thus quite common for Central Asian male communists to marry Russian women, since for 
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this type of ‘perfectly deracinated citizen’, the Soviet identity would always trump family or 
minority group membership (Edgar 2007: 593). For some young urban Uyghurs in Xinjiang, 
attendance at a Chinese-medium school limits their social circles; others grow up in Han-
dominated urban districts where the demographic pool of potential Uyghur partners is 
reduced. The brother-in-law of one respondent married a Han woman he met while working 
in Qaramay, where the population was 73 per cent Han in 1992 (Wang 2004). Socially 
stigmatized persons, such as Uyghur sanpei xiaojie (hostesses working in karaoke rooms), 
may be equally prone to out-group marriage. Mälikä, 20, a minkaomin student and part-time 
hostess, confided, ‘I really got to like my [Han] manager. … He saw me in tears the first time 
I did hostess work, and was impatient. But later he looked after me, and wouldn’t introduce 
me to potentially stroppy customers.’ This girl had lost her father and been forced to hostess 
in order to pay for her university education. She came very close to accepting her Han 
manager’s marriage proposal, finally rejecting him on the grounds that he was not a Muslim. 
Some minkaohan respondents desired to find marriage partners from within their sub-group, 
feeling that they shared a sense of liminality vis-à-vis the ‘authentic’ Uyghur cultural 
community. 
A third factor underlying mixed unions is not structural but functional: the desire to 
improve socio-economic status (cf. Xing 2007). Many Ürümchi respondents attributed the 
recent growth in intermarriage to the ethnic ‘income gap’. Märyäm, a trader of music CDs in 
her thirties from Ghulja, suggested that the primary motive for marrying a Han was financial 
gain. This charge of ‘gold-digging’ was partly substantiated in subsequent interviews. 
Räbigül, 24, a minkaomin policewoman, described her affair with a married Han male as 
follows:  
 
I have a Han colleague I could really have fallen for. … He likes me to show him 
places in Xinjiang. The other week, he paid for me to go to Shanghai with him; we 
stayed in a hotel and everything. Hard to believe at my age. … I bet you think I’m 
only interested in money now! 
 
More recent research on mixed marriage goes beyond the traditional foci of structure 
and function, protesting that these leave no room for ‘the aesthetic spark, the romantic and 
wholly reckless anti-strategy of love’ (Kohn 1998: 69). From this holistic perspective, ‘the 
spontaneity and mystery of attractions to Others mingles with the practicalities and functions 
attendant on these attractions’ (Kohn 1998: 77). This can include physical attraction to a 
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different aesthetic, as when an American woman in one study described the appeal of the 
darker colouring, slimmer builds, and aquiline noses of Middle Eastern men (Brown and 
Farahyar 1994: 177). In interviews, young Uyghur females identified the romantic and gentle 
manner of Han men as key factors underpinning their yearning for a mixed union. Gülshäm 
explained:  
 
I can’t stand Uyghur boys. There’s a world of difference between an Uyghur and a 
Han guy. Take going out on a date: an Uyghur guy won’t make any effort. You’ll 
walk past any old street restaurant and he’ll say, ‘We’ll eat here’. He’ll take you to 
one of the city parks, and sit there. That’s it. Now, a Han guy knows how to treat a 
girl. He’ll look for a place with nice surroundings, a romantic atmosphere.  
 
She rejected the suggestion that there might be a correlation between atmospheric restaurants 
and a man’s financial means, claiming that such places were ‘not necessarily expensive’, then 
continued: ‘It’s about deeds, actions [indicates an Uyghur couple sitting behind us]. See? 
That Uyghur guy just sent that Han flower seller away! … He told the child she should be at 
home. … A Han would have bought the flower and presented it to his girlfriend!’ Gülshäm 
interpreted the man’s behaviour not as a politically symbolic act (as I had), but as ‘an 
inability to understand romance’. Her friend Räbigül, a minkaomin policewoman, agreed: 
‘Han men understand romance [Uy.: romantik]; they know how to treat a girl. They’re very 
gentle. … They know how to talk to you on the phone. Uyghur men just grunt a few words 
and then hang up! I want a guy who will hold my hand as we walk along the street … and 
never let go!’ As we dined outside in central Ürümchi, Gülshäm continuously eyed passing 
Han men, and occasionally Western men. She was particularly impressed by a group of Han 
businessmen, who clearly hailed from the more developed and wealthy east. At one point, she 
squeaked excitedly and indicated a ‘mixed’ couple (Han boy, Uyghur girl) of around 16 years 
of age, walking hand in hand. She was deeply impressed by the couple’s courage. Both 
women identified the casual dress sense of Han men as a ‘pull’ factor, as confirmed by their 
schoolmate, Dilbär: ‘The minkaohan like those [Han] guys who dress down, wear leisure 
gear [Chi.: xiuxian fuzhuang]. Uyghurs usually dress up, … wear Western-style suits, shirts, 
and dress shoes. … The other night, Gülshäm said she didn’t like guys who “dressed like her 
grandfather”!’  
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A fourth factor which may influence attitudes towards intermarriage is a change in 
religious belief, brought about by a secular education, rapid modernization, and/or 
globalization (cf. Shibata’s study on Guyana, 1998: 91). Zemmel found that contemporary 
Anglo-Jews brought up in an environment in which they do not identify positively as Jews 
are more likely to marry out of the faith (1999: 67). The traditional institutions of authority 
(the family; rabbis) exercise less influence than previously because young people see 
marriage as an individual choice. They also tend to go to university and marry later, when 
they are financially independent and no longer reliant on the family, in particular the 
‘protective’ Jewish mother (Zemmel 1999: 75, 195). In contemporary Xinjiang, there may be 
greater potential for intimate relationships with Han peers among Uyghurs who were not 
raised to adhere strictly to orthodox Islamic practice, that is, among those who observe only 
dietary restrictions. Gülshäm admitted that while she considered herself ‘too young’ to have a 
boyfriend (at 20), some of her friends were dating Hans. She shrugged off the suggestion that 
the Islamic faith might create problems for such unions, observing nonchalantly, ‘They [Han 
boyfriends] go home at the end of the day, and don’t eat pork in front of us’. Nevertheless, 
her acknowledgment that Han boyfriends would need to go home to eat pork highlights an 
important distinction between possibilities for courtship and marriage. 
Finally, a mixed union can release some individuals from the strictures of their own 
society, particularly gender roles and expectations. Studies show that some men are attracted 
to out-group women because they are perceived to be more submissive than in-group women, 
as when white American males are drawn to Japanese women (Beigel 1975: 69) or black 
American males to ‘ultra-feminine’ white girls (Downs 1975: 164). Conversely, some women 
may be repulsed by certain male characteristics within their ethnic group, such as traditional 
dominance over women (Shibata 1998: 90) or a tendency towards violence (Beigel 1975: 82). 
For example, Indian women in Guyana ‘do not easily forget witnessing their mothers’ 
miseries at the hands of their Indian husbands’, and some therefore opt to marry African men 
(Shibata 1998: 89). A female Greek respondent described the soft, calm, patient character of 
her Turkish husband, contrasting this against Greek husbands, who ‘shout, swear, and cheat 
on their wives’ (Petronoti and Papagaroufali 2006: 571). A black American woman described 
how her first marriage to an in-group member failed owing to her husband’s male chauvinist 
values, while her second marriage to a Jewish American succeeded because it was based on 
equality (Tartakov and Tartakov 1994: 150). 
In Islam, while the concept of ‘mutual respect in marriage’ − meaning that married 
couples should maintain conjugal intimacy and marital decorum in an expression of the love 
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and compassion between them − is recognized, a woman is nonetheless required to obey her 
husband. This is known as tamkīn (obedience), as opposed to nushūz (disobedience) (Yamani 
1998: 162). Many Muslim females therefore choose to marry out based on the desire to rebel 
against traditional female roles (see Khatibi-Chahidi et al. 1998: 61). In a study of 
intermarriage in Turpan, several female Uyghur and Hui respondents cited the desire to avoid 
male chauvinism as their main motivation in seeking a Han husband (Zhang 2005: 27). My 
interviews in Ürümchi suggested a similar pattern. Patigül, a trader of music CDs in her 
twenties, attributed her friend’s 12-year marriage to a Han to the husband’s relative tolerance 
of her friend’s personal freedom: ‘Her husband is very gentle [Uy.: yawash];9 he lets her get 
away with an awful lot! Not like an Uyghur husband, who would rule with an iron fist [Uy.: 
qoli qattiq].’ Räbigül, a minkaomin policewoman, cited male violence as a key factor putting 
her off relationships with in-group men: ‘Uyghur men are so abrasive towards their wives. … 
I’ve seen too many women getting beaten by their husbands to want that for myself!’ To be 
sure, in a rare example of a mixed union involving an Uyghur husband and Han wife, 
domestic violence had initially proved an issue. The husband, a market trader in his thirties 
from Aqsu named Osman, confided, ‘In the first three years of marriage, I occasionally beat 
her … because we were arguing and she wouldn’t obey me. But I don’t hit her now. Now I 
respect her and she respects me.’ The situation was neatly summarized by Zunun, a 
minkaomin in his thirties working in the service industry: ‘Many Uyghur women … have 
been ill-treated at the hands of Uyghur boyfriends; there is a culture of Uyghur men hitting 
their women. So, if Uyghur women increasingly fall into the arms of Han men, the blame lies 
at least partly with us.’  
 
Parental prohibition and community supervision 
At the time of the broadcast of Xinjiang Girls, the threat of boundary crossing had already 
produced keen resistance within the Uyghur community. This came primarily from the 
protagonists’ parents. Studies show that parental obstruction to intermarriage is most likely to 
occur where one group has a strong sense of ethnic or religious identity, or a history of 
political and/or socio-economic conflict with another group: ‘Where ethnic loyalties are 
strong, intermarriage is even more urgently than usual a family matter’ (Horowitz 2000: 62). 
Respondents in Ürümchi confirmed that few Uyghur parents would allow an Uyghur–Han 
match, estimating the proportion of tolerant parents conservatively at 1 per cent and 
                                                          
9
 The Uyghur word yawash can mean, variously, ‘gentle’, ‘kind’, or ‘obedient’. Many Uyghur men (and some 
women) ridicule Han males for being ‘afraid of their wives’. 
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generously at 10 per cent. Even those parents who might potentially have taken a more 
progressive attitude rarely did so. It is documented that the situation of an absent parent can 
sometimes lessen parental opposition (Khatib-Chahidi et al. 1998: 55). Yet although 
Gülshäm’s father was both Chinese-educated (minkaohan) and a single parent, he forbade her 
to date anyone before completing her higher education, enforcing this via an evening curfew. 
He thus outlawed romance during precisely that time when she was most likely to interact 
with Han boys. While he occasionally threatened to re-marry with a Han, there was a clear 
dividing line between humorous banter and real life. Gülhärä, the 20-year-old minkaomin 
university student mentioned earlier, exclaimed that her father would ‘go mad’ if she became 
intimate with a Han male, while Aynur declared that her parents would ‘kick her out of the 
house’. This was later confirmed by her male cousin, who added with a grin, ‘They would 
say, “She’s no daughter of mine!”’ As a result, most mixed couples in Xinjiang choose to 
separate. In the United States, filial piety prevented many Nisei Japanese-Americans from 
marrying non-Japanese partners (Spickard 1989: 67). In Xinjiang, enduring respect for elders 
combined with adverse parental reaction serves to ensure, even guarantee, endogamy in 
Uyghur society.  
In a minority of cases, a couple may defy familial sanctions by eloping, a practice 
common throughout history and across national borders (Ellman, cited in Spickard 1989: 
194). Thus, community attempts to prevent intermarriage can provoke rebellion in a mixed 
couple and encourage them to take risks. Stoltzfus describes how a German woman engaged 
to a Jewish man shunned the German store where she normally shopped on 1 April 1933 − 
the national boycott day − walking straight past Sturmabteilung (Stormtrooper) guards to 
enter a store marked as Jewish (1996: 39).
10
 Summoned in 1934 to the local Nazi party 
headquarters, where an officer attempted to ‘enlighten’ her about the ‘evil Jews’, the woman 
responded, ‘Well, I’m not marrying a Jew, but a person’ (Stoltzfus 1996: 55). In October 
1933, some German–Jewish couples had rushed to the altar upon hearing that the Nazi 
regime planned to make intermarriages illegal (Stoltzfus 1996: 45). Contemporary Uyghurs 
similarly emphasize the power of love when eloping, as described by Tahirjan and Ghäyrät, 
minkaomin migrant workers in their thirties from Aqsu: ‘The son or daughter says, “This is 
the person I have fallen in love with”. If the parents don’t agree, they go someplace far away, 
coming back only when they have children. Even then, they may ignore the parents and look 
the other way in the street.’ 
                                                          
10
 The Sturmabteilung (SA) was the Nazi militia created by Hitler in 1921, which helped him to power.  
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Obstructive parents may thus be rejected by defiant children in a process of ‘counter-
ostracization’ (cf. Evers 1975: 157). It is worth noting here that elopement has long been a 
recognized social institution among Uyghurs, regardless of whether a proposed match crossed 
ethnic boundaries. Once a couple has eloped, the action is irreversible. A humorous Uyghur 
saying warns: ‘If the parents won’t at first agree to the match, they will after the couple has 
eloped for fifteen days!’ The implication is that, after two weeks alone with a male, the 
female is no longer pak (pure) and no other man will have her. Where a marriage takes place 
against parental wishes, familial sanctions may remain in place long afterwards in the form of 
parental excommunication (cf. Beigel 1975: 72). Patigül, the trader of music CDs mentioned 
earlier, described how her friend was disowned after she took a Han husband who failed to 
convert to Islam: ‘She and her parents don’t talk. They won’t have her in the house. So, every 
Rozi or Qurban festival, she’s in tears because that’s when families should get together.’  
Alongside parental prohibition, community supervision plays a key role in preventing 
Uyghur–Han intermarriage. As Grearson and Smith note, ‘People in intercultural 
relationships must be prepared for extra attention, some of it subtle and some of it not so 
subtle’ (1995: xi). Mixed marriages are often treated with suspicion because they call into 
question boundaries between ‘self’ and ‘other’. This in turn causes extended kin and the local 
community to reinforce negative discourses and stereotypes of the out-group (Breger and Hill 
1998: 4, 9, 12), with intermarriage and mixed-lineage offspring deemed threatening to the 
‘purity’ of one or both groups (Hartley 2010: 237). Community supervision can be 
particularly effective in Islamic societies, which seek to organize the minutiae of family life 
through the collective enforcement of public morals (Ayubi 1991: 35). Since the Arab-
Islamic culture emphasizes ‘external’ over ‘internal’ moral enforcement (i.e. shame over 
guilt), it is the public who are expected to collectively oversee sex, women, and the family 
(Ayubi 1991: 37, 42–44). In contemporary Xinjiang, few dare to pursue marriage with a Han 
person openly. Uyghur–Han couples who appear in public risk the verbal and sometimes 
physical censure of the Uyghur public. Adil, a male restaurateur in his forties, explained: ‘If 
we see an Uyghur and a Han together in the street, we feel anger in our hearts; they appear 
ugly [Uy.: sät körünidu].’ According to Patigül, mixed couples were never seen in the 
Uyghur district (Döngköwrük) of Ürümchi, for people would curse them and hurl jibes at the 
Uyghur girl, such as, ‘What’s wrong? Couldn’t you get an Uyghur partner [Uy.: sanga 
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chiqmidi ma]?’11 Nurmämät, the minkaomin market trader in his forties, and Gülshäm added 
that some individuals would even strike the couple, as confirmed by a 19-year-old respondent 
dating a Han man: ‘It’s hard for us to even go out in Ürümchi. If other Uyghurs see us 
together, they make trouble. Men swear at us and hit us. … Uyghur women aren’t so bad, but 
they still make [critical] comments.’ This girl’s mother would not allow the couple to marry 
in Xinjiang, though the Han male had given up pork and was learning the Uyghur language. 
However, she agreed to her elder daughter’s marriage to a Han in Beijing because their 
married life would be spent away from Xinjiang and the concomitant social pressure. Ben-
Adam (1999: 204) documents similar cases where Uyghur students married to Han people in 
China proper were instructed by parents not to return to Xinjiang. 
   Most effective in enforcing the intermarriage taboo are friends and co-workers. When 
Gülshäm mused upon the possibility of a Han boyfriend, her minkaomin classmate was 
furious, threatening to ‘kick [Gülshäm] in the face’, and break off their friendship. According 
to Gülshäm, this reaction resulted from the Uyghurs’ strong ‘ethnic thinking’ (Chi.: minzu 
guannian): ‘They think Hans are unclean, and set themselves apart. They’re stand-offish; 
they exclude Hans from their lives.’ One might surmise that community supervision would 
therefore have a greater impact on minkaomin, who interact mainly with Uyghur peers. 
Zunun, the service industry employee, described how an interethnic courtship in his 
workplace (Uyghur female, Han male) had collapsed after Uyghur co-workers urged their 
compatriot to abandon the match. However, the taboo can operate just as effectively among 
minkaohan. Despite speaking Chinese more fluently than Uyghur, and being acculturated in 
dress, manner, and musical taste, 15-year-old Burkhan stated that he would never marry a 
Han: ‘If I did, no Uyghur would visit me or befriend me.’ This view was reflected in the 
comment of an Uyghur researcher working for Herbert Yee, who insisted that his daughter 
must never marry a Han lest their family be ‘looked down upon by his fellow people’ (2003: 
450). 
Like familial sanctions, community opposition may continue to affect an Uyghur–Han 
union following the marriage, as in the case of Osman, the Uyghur market trader who is 
married to a Han woman. Several years after the wedding, a fellow trader from Khotan 
continued to voice strong disapproval of Osman’s choice: ‘He has a good heart. But we don’t 
approve of him marrying that Han, because she’s not a Muslim and won’t take the 
religion. … They just play with this [points to mouth] and this [points to genitals]. … That’s 
                                                          
11
 This respondent used ma at the end of her question instead of the Uyghur mu, a common habit in Ürümchi, 
where the distinction between the Uyghur and Chinese question particles is increasingly blurred. 
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all it’s about.’ He thus defiled Osman’s relationship by describing it in purely sexual terms. 
The wife’s failure to convert meant she had to keep away from her husband’s kebab stand for 
fear that Uyghur customers would deem her presence haram (unclean). Instead, she 
performed less visible tasks in the restaurant’s kitchen. Patigül expressed a similar lingering 
suspicion of her friend’s Han husband, who had not converted, confessing that her appetite 
failed when visiting their home. 
 
Male honour, female shame  
Marrying out is often considered a violation of group identity and of the ‘sexual taboo’ 
(Barbara 1989: 15). At the heart of this lies the notion of the ‘gendered ethnic centre’, an 
ideology which defines in-group women in symbolic terms as ‘mothers of our people’ 
(Breger and Hill 1998: 15). It was long ago shown that in ‘intimate’ Mediterranean societies, 
the basis for honour and shame was essentially sexual, with women expected to remain 
chaste until married and faithful thereafter. A single mistake destroys female honour and, 
with it, that of their close male relatives (Peristiany 1966; cf. Antoun 1968: 674–8 on 
modesty in Arab villages). Thus it is intermarrying women who often become targets of 
harassment when crossing normative boundaries (Shibata 1998: 84, 96). Particularly in plural 
societies, minority women may become ‘forbidden persons’, prevented by their menfolk from 
forming relationships with majority men, so that marriage becomes the last arena in which 
minorities retain control (Barbara 1989: 14–15). Restrictions on in-group women may be 
precipitated by a sense of political, social, cultural, or economic impotence (Buijs 1993: 5, 
18). In West Berlin, for instance, high unemployment created feelings of disempowerment 
among Palestinian refugees, and males reacted by reconstructing the ideals of female 
seclusion and gendered segregation of space (Abdulrahim 1993: 67). In this way, they 
reconstructed group identity around male honour and female shame (Breger and Hill 1998: 
14–15). 
In Xinjiang, I did interview some female respondents who demonstrated a capacity 
for tolerance of, and empathy with, Uyghur–Han romantic unions. These ‘universalists’ 
hailed exclusively from the young generation, and invariably focused on love as the central 
consideration in courtship. However, the vast majority opposed intermarriage with Han 
people, and all the more fiercely in the context of the phenomenon’s increase. Uyghur men 
were especially visceral in their opposition to interethnic courtship, expressing this in violent 
criticism of the females concerned and an earnest defence of Uyghur males. Shökhrät, a male 
intellectual in his thirties from Kashgar, cynically rejected the idea that Han men were ‘more 
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romantic’, countering, ‘The Chinese are loaded, the Uyghurs have no money’. He added that 
such girls ‘don’t have a brain’ [Uy.: kalisi yoq] and are ‘little better than prostitutes’, a view 
later echoed by Tashmämät, a historian in his forties. Jelil, the pious university graduate in 
his twenties, argued that Uyghur women were attracted both to the superior financial means 
of Han partners and to their often higher level of education (this explaining why rich Uyghur 
businessmen may be deemed less attractive). Tashmämät listed four reasons why Uyghur 
women date Han men:  
 
First, some girls will go with anyone who has money, with Hans, old men. … Second, 
these girls have grown up among Hans [are minkaohan or Ürümchi-born] and are 
closer to Hans. Third, these girls have often slept around, they are broken [Uy.: buzuq, 
no longer chaste], and cannot find an Uyghur husband. Fourth, they are living in their 
own world [Uy.: özining dunya], a dream world [Uy.: khiyali dunya].  
 
The phenomenon was thus attributed to ‘gold-digging’ (marriage for financial gain), 
acculturation, lost virginity, and a lack of common sense.
 
Abdukerim, an observant 
minkaomin graduate from Aqsu in his twenties, identified the relative upward mobility of 
urban Hans and, while allowing for the sanctity of love, characterized Uyghur–Han marriage 
as an ‘empty-headed’ act. All four implied that such women lack a political conscience. 
Interestingly, Dilbär, the minkaomin high school student, agreed with many of these 
comments, which suggests that some Uyghur women may be equally critical. According to 
Han scholar Li Xiaoxia, it is ‘inevitable that minority women attracted by the higher political 
and social position of Han males will abandon in-group customs and adopt those of their Han 
spouse’ (2006: 84, my translation). His view is endorsed by Xing Wei, who found in the early 
1990s that minority women in the south-west were more likely to marry out than male 
counterparts (2007: 169). 
Just one respondent openly invoked the political situation in connection with the 
intermarriage taboo. This was Ömär, the minkaomin high school student, who explained:  
 
We cannot accept Uyghurs marrying Hans − unless the latter convert to Islam. It’s too 
much to bear. We think, ‘They took away our country [Uy.: dölitimizni eliwaldi], our 
language, and our culture, they made us like them. And now they want our women 
too.’ … These things are connected and cannot be separated. And so we oppose 
intermarriage. It’s the final straw, the last thing we can resist. I can’t bear the thought 
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of reading in history books that … we were assimilated through intermarriage with 
the Han. That’s too humiliating. I don’t want us to end up like the Native Americans.  
 
Uyghur–Han intermarriage is thus interpreted as a ‘loss’ in a context where Uyghur language, 
culture, and social status are under threat. Here, women become the ‘culture bearers’, to be 
protected from encroachment by Han men as a means to preserve the Uyghur cultural 
heritage and maintain face. In this way, where other cultural markers such as language are 
gradually eroded, the intermarriage taboo comes to embody the final arena of ethnic 
resistance (cf. Borchigud 1994 on Inner Mongolia).  
Notions of loss and restoration of male honour carry a particular weight in Islamic 
societies, and are especially marked in Arab countries where males experienced a double 
humiliation during the twentieth century: national humiliation following the 1967 defeat by 
Israel; and social humiliation caused by class demotion resulting from certain socio-economic 
policies. Here, women have often become the vehicle for the ‘restoration’ of male honour 
(Ayubi 1991: 40). For many Uyghur males, the vision of in-group women courting Han men 
can be characterized as the painful culmination of a series of humiliating blows, including the 
invasion and political domination of the Uyghur homeland, the erosion of Uyghurs’ social 
position through discriminatory socio-economic policies, and the attack on Uyghurs’ cultural 
heritage through assimilatory policies towards language, culture, and religion. As Nurmämät 
remarked, ‘If a mixed couple appears in Erdaoqiao [the Chinese name for Döngköwrük, the 
Uyghur district], people swear at them, even hit them! If it’s an Uyghur girl. If it’s a boy, they 
say nothing.’ The responsibility for avoiding further national shame and rebuilding national 
honour thus lies squarely with Uyghur women. The gender discrepancy is partly explained by 
the Islamic norm of patrilineal descent. Uyghur women are required to marry in-group men, 
or men from other Muslim groups, to ensure continuity of religious identity. A Muslim 
husband provides the child with his name and religion, and ensures that the mother − as the 
source of the child’s religious and moral education − continues to practise Islam (cf. Yamani 
1998: 154).  
Most male respondents firmly rejected the suggestion that Uyghur women are fleeing 
to Han men to escape Uyghur male violence. Tashmämät observed: 
 
The Hans interact according to a system of Confucian relationships, one of 
which requires that women obey their husbands. Han households in Xinjiang 
operate on this basis. In an Uyghur household, we say that men should 
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dominate, but don’t put this into practice for fear of what may happen to us in 
the afterlife [Uy.: Yaman bolidu däp − things will go badly on the Day of 
Judgment]. 
 
While admitting that some men behave badly by sleeping with and then abandoning girls, 
Jelil protested that Uyghur males no longer beat women. He also defended them against the 
charge that they do not understand romance: ‘It’s true that Uyghur men don’t do romantic 
talk, can’t do it. … But they still feel those things in their hearts.’ 
 
Conclusion 
Li Li has suggested that, as the most influential genre in China’s new media landscape, the 
television drama ‘embodies the many complex aspects of social forces and relationships 
contested in China’s reform’ (2011: 327). Its function as a ‘dynamic cultural agent’ in a 
public space governed by political interventions can be traced back to the CCP’s response in 
1991 to Kewang (‘Yearnings’), a groundbreaking TV play set against the Cultural Revolution. 
Li Ruihuan, the Politburo member charged with overseeing ideological matters following the 
1989 Tian’anmen incident, invited the film crew to Zhongnanhai in Beijing, and commended 
the drama as a ‘worthy model’ for the nation’s literary and artistic writers. He observed that 
in order to make socialist principles − defined as ‘honest, sympathetic, sacrificial, and 
harmonious’ human relations − acceptable to the masses, media workers must learn to use 
the forms favoured by the populace. Since then, the Jiang and Hu administrations have 
advocated the ‘harmonious society’ as the primary theme in Chinese media production, with 
sympathetic feelings generated by TV dramas forming the core of the ‘social, moral, and 
ethical values that … could hold together a united and harmonious society’ (Li Li 2011: 338–
9). Yet the extent to which Xinjiang Girls reinforced this ideal is questionable. The 
presentation of true love, modelled on the narratives of ‘genuine human sentiment’ that have 
characterized Chinese melodrama since the 1980s, proved unconvincing for most Uyghur 
viewers. Shibata notes that a brief increase in intermarriage can add extra force to local 
antagonism, ‘highlighting new weaknesses in the racial barricade … that need to be shored 
up’ (1998: 87). The response from the Uyghur community in 2004 suggests just such a social 
backlash. Andrew Skuse has described the deliberate sidelining of the Taliban in the Afghan 
radio play New Home, New Life (1996–1998) as ‘reflective of production struggles over 
political and moral interpretations of Afghan society’ (2005: 162, 166). In the same way, one 
can imagine the scene as media workers debated possible endings for Xinjiang Girls: Could 
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the Uyghur audience accept the eventual marriage of the second eldest daughter to her Han 
beau? Or would this lead to street demonstrations in the regional capital, as had the 
publication of the book Sexual Customs (considered offensive to Islam) in 1989? The 
compromise position eventually adopted − to leave the ending open as the Han beau awaits 
the modernization of Uyghur thought − did not provoke street protest. However, I would 
argue that it did bring the Uyghurs’ subjection directly into their consciousness, causing them 
to challenge the ideology marketed by the dominant group, and to ‘demand a form of 
correction’ in everyday life (cf. Lee and Cho 1990: 40–41).  
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